Much of my research is on restructured electricity markets. For example, Jim Reitzes and I use a modification of the arbitrage cost methodology to model the value of electricity transmission.
"The Effectiveness of FERC’s Transmission Policy: Is Transmission Used Efficiently and When Is It Scarce?,” (with James D. Reitzes) Journal of Regulatory Economics 34:1 (2008) 1-26.
Dek Terrell and I used Bayesian analysis to determine the efficiency of electricity generation plants.
“Measuring Potential Efficiency Gains from Deregulation of Electricity Generation: A Bayesian Approach” (with M. Dek Terrell), Review of Economics and Statistics, 83:3 (August 2001) 523-530.
In 2006 I was the editor of Electric Choices: Deregulation and the Future of Electric Power, Rowman and Littlefield. This book got nice reviews in a number of places. You can read the introduction here.
For several years, David Bradford and I have been conducting research on the impact of direct to consumer advertising. Contrary to what you might think, such advertising can lead to better treatment for patients. One example of our work is
Over a number of years, I have written several "case retrospectives" that have gone and reviewed historic antitrust cases, and found they were not what antitrust historians would have you believe. The first of these dealt with something call the "essential facilities doctrine," "Terminal Railroad Revisited: Foreclosure of an Essential Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly?" (with David Reiffen), Journal of Law and Economics 33:2 (October 1990) 419-438. Here David Reiffen and I contest whether there is any viability in unregulated markets to the antitrust concept of "essential facilities."
In "The Mystery of Lorain Journal and the Quest for Foreclosure", Texas Law Review, 73:6 (May 1995) 1255-1306, John Lopatka and I examine a famous case of "non-price predation" and found it resembled no such thing.
“Are Vertical Restraints Anti- or Pro-competitive? Lessons from Interstate Circuit,” Journal of Law and Economics, 44:1 (April 2001) 131-160, David Butz and I examined a well-known antitrust case that allegedly dealt with both collusion and the use of vertical restraints. By this point, you'll realize that David and I came up with a different story.
More recently, I examined an important case involved alleged manipulation in energy markets in “Index Manipulation, the CFTC, and the Inanity of DiPlacido,” American Enterprise Institute Reg-Markets Working Paper 09-06. February 2009.
For information about my entire body of work, see my resume.